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Abstract. We apply the Parry-Small (2005) framework to asses whether
the level taxation of motor fuel is broadly appropriate in a group of coun-
tries (OECD, BRICs and South Africa) accounting for more than 80 per-
cent of world greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper deals with
emissions from oil combustion in transport, which accounts for about 40
percent of co2 emissions. In the benchmark specification, we find that
six countries (accounting, in turn, for more than 40 percent of motor-fuel
GHG world emissions) would be undertaxing motor fuel. We evaluate the
sensitivity of the results to the values of the elasticities and externalities
that we use. We find that varying the values of these parameters (within
the level of uncertainty reasonably associated with them) significantly af-
fects the results. This implies that, while informative, the results must be
taken as indicative. Further analysis for a particular country must rely in
a well-informed choice for the values of their country-specific parameters.
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1. Introduction
The taxation of motor fuel displays a great variability across different countries (Fig. 1).
While these products are generally subject to broadly similar consumption taxes (i.e., VAT
and excises), the rates applied by individual countries, especially on the excise component,
vary substantially. As a consequence, the final share of taxes in the final price paid by
consumers ranges from a high 70 percent (e.g., The Netherlands, U.K., or Turkey) to
virtually zero or negative (e.g., subsidies in oil-producing countries).
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From a national perspective; should motor fuel be taxed differently than other goods?
While the public finance literature provides guidance on the optimal structure for indi-
rect taxation (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) which implies different rates for different
goods, from a practical point of view, administrative costs generally discourage differen-
tial taxation. However, excisable goods are an exception, since these are easy to tax at
the source (typically imports or reduced number of domestic producers). Moreover, in the
case of motor fuel, its consumption generates substantial external effects, which justifies its
differential taxation. In addition, the taxation of oil rents could warrant specific taxation
We thank Masami Kojima, Apurva Sarangi and Jon Strand for useful comments.
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for motor fuel. Bergstrom (1982) argued that an excise tax is an appropriate instrument
for oil-importing countries to capture some of the oil rents that would otherwise accrue to
the oil-exporting countries.1
There is a large amount of work providing the theoretical basis for environmental taxes
(Baumol, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1971, 1988). Moreover, in theory, petroleum taxes
have the potential of not only improving environmental quality but also raising revenue
and reducing welfare costs offering a so-called “double dividend” (Pearce, 1991). However,
in practice, the answer to how large motor fuel taxes should be is less than straightforward
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009).
To address this issue, of the appropriate level of motor fuel taxation, Parry and Small
(2005) develop a model balancing the level motor fuel taxes against all other taxes. They
show that the second-best optimal tax on motor fuel can be broken into several components:
an adjusted Pigovian tax to account for the external effects of motor fuel; a general Ramsey-
type consumption tax component; and a reduced-congestion feedback.
The Pigovian tax component has received renewed attention when considering the work-
ings of a global carbon tax for climate-change mitigation (Aldy et al., 2008). More recently,
the French government has announced the introduction of an ‘ecotax’ with an initial rate
of C15.42 per ton of co2 (C17 per metric ton), gradually increasing over time. Table 1
displays the implications of this tax; the entries for the $10 tax are multiplied by 2.31
(= 1.542 × 1.5C/$). An issue that arises in the context of international carbon pricing
through taxation is that if ‘carbon’ is already taxed to a certain extent; how could com-
pliance with an internationally-agreed carbon tax be determined? As seen in Fig. 1, many
countries already apply taxes well in excess of the /c20.33/gal of gasoline implied by the
new proposed French ecotax. But, of course, these taxes already in place may be justified
on other grounds, distinct from climate-change considerations.
This paper poses the question of whether the Parry-Small (P-S) framework offers suit-
able guidance for the level of taxation of motor fuel across countries. We apply the P-S
framework to the group of countries that currently account for the larger consumption of
motor fuel (i.e., including the OECD and BRICs), allowing for country-specific charac-
teristics (i.e., elasticities, costs, etc). We compare the P-S estimated second-best optimal
taxes with the actual taxes in these countries, and we assess the sensitivity of the results
1 Given the significant market power in the extraction and refining of oil products Kay and King (1980)
argue that “the imposition of a tariff on oil may be a rational response by OECD countries to the OPEC
cartel” (Kay and King, 1980). An excise on oil products could play the same role for non oil-producer
countries. However, a more recent literature on th effects of adding motor fuel tariffs arrives to different
conclusions. Maskin and Newbery (1991) and Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992) point to the problem of
the dynamic inconsistency that may arise in ‘open loop’ models. For instance, tariff time trajectories
announced by large importers of the resource may not be credible as long term commitments since it will
pay the importer to deviate from the announced plan as time evolves. Karp and Newbery (1991) show,
however, that ‘open loop’ Nash equilibria with competitive or oligopolistic suppliers and competitive or
oligopsonistic consumers all are dynamically consistent in a tariff setting game. Finally, Farzin (1996) shows
how rent acquisition will still be a feature with an environmental tax, a finding confirmed by Amundsen
and Scho¨b (1999), who show that the total resource rent may be appropriated through co-ordination and
combination of environmental taxes without jeopardizing Pareto optimality. We do not deal with any of
these issues in this paper.
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Table 1. Equivalency of Units
Tax per ton of co2 equals:
$10.00 C15.42
$36.67 $84.71 per ton of Carbon
$4.77 $11.02 per barrel of oil
/c8.80 /c20.33 per gal of gasoline
/c2.29 /c5.29 per liter of gasoline
/c0.78 /c1.80 per kilowatt-hour of electricity
Source: Own calculations and Aldy et al. (2008).
with respect to key parameters.
We find that, in the benchmark specification, a set of broadly large-emission countries
are undertaxing motor fuel. We evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the values of the
elasticities and externalities we use in the application of P-S framework. We find significant
effects on the optimal taxes within the level of uncertainty reasonably associated with the
values of these parameters. Increasing the shadow value on GHG emissions to $100 per
ton of carbon (from the $25 benchmark value) and the size of the labor-leisure substitution
response to wages result in more than half the countries undertaxing motor fuel.
Section 2 reviews the issues on optimal indirect taxation. Section 3 applies the P-S
framework to a set of countries and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Optimal Taxation of Petroleum Products
There are several well-established principles guiding the design of an efficient system of
commodity taxes in the absence of market imperfections (see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1980; Myles, 1995). The first principle is that, in the absence of market imperfections,
taxation should be restricted to final goods, thus leaving untaxed all intermediate inputs
in the production process (Diamond and Mirlees, 1971). By preventing tax-induced dis-
tortions in the allocation of resources, this approach maximizes total output, and hence
the potential tax base.
A second principle (Ramsey, 1927) dictates that commodity taxes should result in sim-
ilar reductions in demand for all commodities—where ‘similar’ refers to ‘equally-costly’
from the perspective of the consumers’ welfare. This principle implies higher taxation
falling on commodities displaying smaller (substitution) responses to price changes—i.e.,
on the more price-inelastic goods. The objective is to equalize, across commodities, the
proportional reduction in demand relative to the no-tax situation. This proportional re-
duction in demand is termed the index of discouragement by Mirlees (1976). Moreover, to
ameliorate the disincentive effects distorting leisure-work choices (since commodity taxes
lower the reward to work), heavier taxes should fall on goods which are more complements
to leisure (i.e., substitutes to work), and lighter taxes should fall on goods that are more
complementary to work.
Finally, some degree of differential taxation can also be justified on distributional con-
cerns and, as we shall discuss below, on the correction of externalities (Pigou, 1920).
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In practice, most countries combine VAT (or sales taxes) and excise taxes on selected
commodities to create a tax structure broadly conforming to the principles discussed above.
In effect, the VAT, through the credit-invoice method, discharges intermediate inputs
from taxation. Furthermore, the excises on selected products (typically tobacco, alcoholic
drinks, motor fuel products and luxury goods) allow for some degree of discriminatory
taxation along the lines discussed above.
Against this background, several characteristics differentiate motor fuel from other com-
modities justifying their heavier taxation. First, the consumption of motor fuel generates
substantial external effects. These include congestion, noise, local pollution, and emissions
of greenhouse gases. The presence of these externalities requires that prices incorporate the
external costs that the consumption of motor fuel imposes on society. Thus, when motor
fuel are used as inputs in production, their intermediate quality in the production process
is lost since the externalities generated are effectively final consumer products. Conse-
quently, marginal-cost pricing on intermediate transactions must now include the external
costs. Second, from a revenue perspective, the consumption of motor fuel displays a low
own-price elasticity (at least in the short-term) and a high income elasticity. These char-
acteristics make their heavier taxation attractive from both efficiency and distributional
perspectives.2
2.1. Parry-Small Framework
Parry and Small (2005) consider a revenue-neutral tax reform, and they examine the
tradeoff of taxes on gasoline versus the rest of the taxes, aggregated as a tax on labor.
In this context, they estimate the second-best optimal gasoline tax taking into account
the corresponding externalities (adjusted Pigovian tax), the balance between commodity
taxation and labor taxation (Ramsey tax), and congestion feedback. The second-best
optimal gasoline tax, tF , can be implicitly expressed as:
tF =
MECF
1 +MEBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjusted Pigovian tax
(1)
+
(1 − ηMI)cLL
ηFF
(qF + tF )
tL
1 − tL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ramsey tax
(2)
2 Nonetheless, the regressive incidence of motor fuel taxes—especially in places with poor public transportation—
is widely regarded as one of its main defects. Zhang and Baranzani (2000) present findings from other
studies in the US and UK showing that the relative burden of the additional tax is heavier for the poorer
deciles. However, for the U.K., Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) show that adjusting for household
composition results in a more equal distribution of absolute motor fuel expenditures. A recent study by
Parry et al. (2006) shows that measures of tax incidence over the life-cycle, instead of annual, income, find
that CO2 taxes are less regressive than static analyses suggest.
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+
β
(M/F )
Ec[LL − (1 − ηMI)cLL]
tL
1− tL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Congestion Feedback
(3)
Note that the optimal tax, tF , enters into the three terms (1)–(3); through the expressions
for MECF , MEBL, and tL (Table 2). Consequently, the expression above is an implicit
function for tF , and must be solved using numerical methods.3
[1] The first component stands for the adjusted Pigovian tax. This term is proportional to
the sum of all marginal externalities, MECF , and inversely proportional to (one plus)
the marginal excess burden associated with the labor tax, MEBL. In a first-best world,
pollution taxes should be set equal to marginal damage—the level that fully internalizes
an externality. However, the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes changes this
conclusion. Environmental taxes typically exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions and,
therefore, the optimal pollution tax should lie below the Pigovian level. This is driven
by the tax-interaction effect, which arises when the pollution tax affects the equilibrium
quantity of another taxed good, such as labor. Thus, the excess-burden term accounts for
the tax-interaction effect arising from pre-existing distortions due to taxation. Another
perspective on this issue is that, relative to a lump-sum taxation world, society is poorer
when it has to use distortionary taxation to raise public funds and, consequently, it must
live with a larger level of externalities.
[2] The second component stands for the Ramsey component that involves the usual price
and income elasticities of motor fuel use, and of vehicle-miles traveled, which underlie the
main idea that motor fuel should be more heavily taxed if it is a relatively weak substitute
for leisure. The smaller the price and income elasticities of motor fuel, (ηFF , and ηMI)
the larger this Ramsey component will be. Also, this component is proportional to the
compensated labor elasticity, and it grows to allow for decreases in the labor tax, tL
when labor is more elastic.
[3] The third component stands for the positive congestion feedback effect of reduced con-
gestion on labor supply. Since labor is taxed, reducing congestion is welfare-improving.
The reduced congestion increases time available for both labor and leisure. As it turns
out, this component is not very large in practice. Note that the congestion externality
is already part of the Pigovian component (1).
MECF is the marginal external cost of motor fuel use, which includes carbon emis-
sions (EPF ; /c6/gal or $25 per ton of carbon), and costs associated with congestion (EC),
accidents (EA) and pollution (EPM ; /c2/mile):
MECF = EPF +
β
(M/F )
(EC + EA + EPM )
MEBL is the marginal excess burden of labor taxation, which increases with both the
wage tax, tL and the wage elasticity of labor, LL:
MEBL =
tLLL
1− tL(1 + LL)
3 A Mathematica notebook that will solve for the optimal tF is available from the authors.
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Table 2. Notation and Parameter Values
(Parameter values common for all countries are in parentheses.)
ηMI : (0.60) Elasticity of demand of vehicle-miles traveled with respect to disposable income.
ηMF : (0.22) Elasticity of demand of vehicle-miles traveled with respect to gasoline price.
ηFF : (0.55) Own-price elasticity of demand for gasoline.
LL : (0.20) Elasticity of labor supply.
cLL : (0.35) Compensated elasticity of labor supply.
β : (0.40) Fraction of motor fuel demand elasticity due to reduced vehicle-miles traveled; β = ηMF /ηMM .
Fuel efficiency, measured as miles/gal is given by a constant-elasticity formula:(
M
F
)
=
(
M0
F 0
)(
qF + tF
qF + t0F
)−(ηFF−ηMF )
The effective (average) tax rate on labor is defined as tL = αG−(tF /qF )αF , where αG and
αF are the shares of government spending and gasoline expenditures in national output.
Table 2 and section 2.2 explains the remaining notation (all notation here is identical
to Parry and Small (2005); ‘0’ superscripts indicate initial values). Parameter values that
are common for all countries are in parentheses in Table 2. When the values are country-
specific, section 2.2 explains the sources.
2.2. Data sources for country-specific parameter values
(M0/F 0) : Initial motor fuel efficiency: P-S use values of 20 miles/gal for U.S. and 30
miles/gal for U.K. From IEA (2007) we obtain values for OECD countries and from
IEA (2008) we obtain motor fuel efficiency values for India, Brazil, China and tran-
sition countries, the latter we assume is equal to Russia’s. A Korean government
report4 stated passenger cars motor fuel efficiency was 10.69 kilometers per liter in
2006.5 For Mexico we obtain values of 28 miles/gal.6 For the rest of the countries
(Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary, Iceland,
Poland, Turkey and Czech Republic) we used the median value for European coun-
tries, 31 miles/gal, and the sample median for South Africa (27 miles/gal).
EC : External congestion costs: Congestion costs are highly variable across times and
locations; thus P-S use central values of marginal congestion cost of 3.5 cents/mile
4 See http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-143417929.html; article appeared in YON - Yonhap News
Agency of Korea , March 19, 2006.
5 http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-143417929.html
6 Results presented at a Workshop on Sustainable Transport in Latin America in Washington DC
in 2005 http://www.autoproject.org.cn/english/new advance en/Mex%20TRB%20presentation.pdf
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for the U.S. and 7 cents/mile for the U.K. From Carisma and Lowder(2008) we
take values of deadweight loss European countries based on an INFRAS/IWW 2000
study. Transforming the 0.68% deadweight loss value for U.K. into 7 cents/mile, we
compute the values in cents/mile for these other countries. From Carisma and Low-
der(2008) we also obtain results for most of the other countries which the authors
compile from separate studies. The Korea Transport Institute’s latest estimate of
congestion costs is of 2.97% of GDP in 2004 while the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture and Transport in Japan estimated congestion costs for this country at around
2% of GDP in 2000. For Sao Paulo, a cost of 2.4% of GDP was estimated by
Willoughby (2000); for Mexico City, a cost of 2.65% of GDP by Ochoa and Radian
(1997). We use the results for these cities for Brazil and Mexico. For India, we
assume the numbers to be similar to those in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, 2.1 and
1.8% of GDP respectively according to a study on sustainable infrastructure in Asia
completed by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (2007). Creutzig and He (2009) estimate the congestion cost for China
is 3.35% of GDP and the Russian government has estimated that congestion costs
for Russia are about 3% of GDP.7 We set the value of congestion cost at 2.15% of
GDP. Finally, from Carisma and Lowder(2008) we obtain the cost of congestion for
U.K. as a percent of GDP to be 3% from which we then transform the other figures
into cents/miles. For the rest of the European countries for which we do not have
data available (Hungary, Iceland, Slovak Republic, Turkey and Czech Republic), we
use the median for all European countries, which is 2.4 cents/mile. For Canada and
Australia, we use the median for the whole sample, which is 3.1 cents/mile.
EA : External accident costs: P-S take 3.0 and 2.4 cents/mile as the central estimates
for the U.S. and U.K., respectively. The difference, according to the authors is
mainly based on the fact that the U.K. has about two-thirds as high a willingness
to pay for reduction in injury and death, and a lower fatality rate in the U.K. For
European countries we rely only on average accident costs in C/1,000 passenger per
km estimated by INFRAS/IWW (2004). Accident costs for China are estimated to
be 1.5 % of GDP.8 For Russia the Government has estimated traffic accident costs to
represent 2.55% of GDP.9 for South Africa, the estimate is of 1% of GDP,10 and for
Australia, 2.3% of GDP. Mendoza et al. (1998). estimate that external accident costs
for Mexico represent 0.35% of GDP. Mohan (2002) provides estimates of external
crash cost for Brazil, Korea and India.
qF : Producer price (ex-tax) and initial gasoline tax rates (t0F ): Most of the ex-
tax prices and taxes data are taken from the March 2009 issue of Energy De´tente.
For Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa and Norway we use ex-tax prices and taxes
7 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-roads15-2009jul15,0,6188164.story
8 http://www.car-accidents.com/country-car-accidents/china-car-accidents-crash.html
9 http://www.kommersant.com/p-13563/r 500/Traffic accident/
10 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qa5327/is 291/ai n29030852/
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in 2005 from Energy De´tente. For Iceland and Poland we used the median of pre-tax
price and tax for all European countries, 473 cents and 327 cents respectively.
αG : Total government spending over GDP: Parry and Small (2005) use central
values of 0.35 for the U.S. and 0.45 for the U.K., based on summing average labor
and consumption tax rates in Mendoza et al. (1994). We use two sources for data on
general Government expenditure: the OECD stats and World Economic Outlook
(WEO).11 We averaged government expenditure for the period 2005–07 so as to
smooth variability.
αF : Fuel production shares: Using the the shares of gross domestic production spent
on motor fuel, Parry and Small (2005) set values of 0.012 values for the U.S. and
0.009 for the U.K. The calculation is based on n 1999 consumption of motor fuel
multiplied by the gasoline price/gal net-of-tax over GDP. For our estimates we use
data for billions of barrels of Motor gasoline consumed by each country in 2006 from
IEA. The gasoline price net of tax (qF ) that we use is from Energy De´tente.
See Table 6 for country-specific parameter values, and Table 7 for the list of data sources.
3. Optimal Fuel Taxes for Selected Countries
In this section, we estimate the optimal motor fuel taxes for the group of countries consid-
ered in this study, which includes OECD members and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India
and China) and South Africa. These countries, as a group, account for more than 80 per-
cent of fossil-fuel related green house gas (GHG) emissions (see Fig. 2). Note that these
emissions include coal emissions which may be the predominant source in some countries,
like China.
Table 3 shows the estimated optimal motor fuel taxes, given the values of the benchmark
parameters, for our group of countries. These results should be taken as broadly indicative
and not as precise estimates of the optimal taxes. We shall discuss their sensitivity to
key parameters below. In Table 3, the countries are sorted, in descending order, by the
difference between the optimal tax on motor fuel (tF ) and the actual tax (t0F ). Countries
undertaxing motor fuel the most appear at the top of the table while countries that would
be overtaxing motor fuel the most appear closer to the bottom of the table.
China and the USA, the two largest transport oil-related GHG emitters in 2006 according
to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) (see last column in Table 3) are
among the six countries that are undertaxing fossil fuels. The rest of the countries that
are undertaxing are among the few countries in the world that individually account for
more than 2% of total transport oil-related emissions.12 Note that the size of a country’s
11 OECD.Stat includes data and metadata for OECD countries and selected non-member economies.
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database contains selected macroeconomic data series from the
statistical appendix of the World Economic Outlook report, the result of analysis and projections carried
out by IMF for many individual countries and country groups.
12 In the table, only Germany, Japan, France Italy and India show transport oil related emissions of more
than 2% of world total. Outside our list of countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, each accounting for 2.1% ot
total transport oil-related emissions are the only countries with comparable high fuel oil emissions in 2006
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The consequences of environmental policy inaction 
If no new policy actions are taken, within the next few decades we risk irreversibly altering the environmental 
basis for sustained economic prosperity. To avoid that, urgent actions are needed to address in particular the “red 
light” issues of climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity and health impacts of pollution and hazardous 
chemicals (Table 1). 
Without further policies, by 2030, for example: 
• Global emissions of greenhouse gases are projected to grow by a further 37%, and 52% to 2050 (Figure 3a). 
This could result in an increase in global temperature over pre-industrial levels in the range of 1.7-2.4° Celsius 
by 2050, leading to increased heat waves, droughts, storms and floods, resulting in severe damage to key 
infrastructure and crops. 
• A considerable number of 
today’s known animal and 
plant species are likely to 
be extinct, largely due to 
expanding infrastructure 
and agriculture, as well 
as climate change 
(Figure 4). Food and 
biofuel production 
together will require a 
10% increase in farmland 
worldwide with a further 
loss of wildlife habitat. 
Continued loss of 
biodiversity is likely to 
limit the Earth’s capacity 
to provide the valuable 
ecosystem services that 
support economic growth 
and human well-being. 
 
Figure 4.  Sources of losses in mean species abundance to 2030 
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Fig. 2. Anthropogenic green house emissions: OECD, BRICs and Rest of the World.
(Source: http://www.oecd.org/env ronment/outlookto2030)
emissions do not play any role in the determination of the optimal tax, tF , in (1)–(3).
However, obviously, the size of the tax does affect final prices and energy efficiency.
The Ramsey and Pigou components dominate the determination of tF , with the Conges-
tion Feedback component playing a very minor role (note that the congestion externality
is part of the Pigou component). The relative importance of the Ramsey and Pigou com-
ponents in Table 3 is driven mostly by differences in producer prices, qF (Table 6). The
lower qF the lower the Ramsey component—e.g., compare Germany and the UK in table
3, and note the difference in qF in Table 6. Table 3 reports the implied excess burden
of non-motor fuel taxation (1 + MEBL). (Remember that in this framework all other
taxes are lumped into an aggregate labor tax.) These values are bro dly in line with the
lower-range of values used in the literature for the marginal cost of funds, between 1.1 and
1.25. Other things equal, the larger the MEBL, the larger the optimal motor fuel tax.
Fig. 3 summarizes (using box plots13 ) the results in Table 4, which shows the impact of
changes in the values of key parameters in the results, across the different countries. The
size of the response to the variation in a particular parameter depends on the values of all
others, so these results inform on what matters most, given the configuration of parameters.
We consider changes of 0.1 in the values of the labor and motor fuel elasticities, and changes
of /c10 in the climate-change emissions damage.
There is large heterogeneity in the response across countries when altering three of the
according to IEA.
13 A box plot is a histogram-like method of displaying data. The quartiles Q1 and Q3 delimit the box,
while the statistical median is represented by a horizontal line in the box. The “whisker” are extended to
the farthest points that are within 3
2
ti es the interqu rtile range of (Q3 −Q1). Then, every point more
than 3
2
times the interquartile range from the end of a box, is represented by a dot, and it is considered
an outlier.
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Fig. 3. Response of the Optimal Fuel Taxes to variations of 0.1 in the value of
each elasticity, and of /c10 in the value of the GHG emission externality (∆tF in /c/gal).
elasticities: the compensated labor elasticity, CL , the elasticity of demand of vehicle-miles
traveled with respect to disposable income, ηMI , and the own-price elasticity of demand
for gasoline, ηFF (note the spreads in Fig. 3). The range of responses when changing
the elasticity of demand of vehicle-miles traveled with respect to gasoline price, ηMF , and
the damage associated with emissions, EPF is much narrower. The uncompensated labor
elasticity shows a rather unimportant effect, and little variation. The median (horizontal
bar within each box) effects of ∆CL , ∆ηMF , and ∆E
PF are about /c10/gal. The magnitude
of the median effects to ∆ηMI and ∆ηFF is twice as large, about −20/c/gal.
Table 5 shows the optimal taxes when we increase the labor elasticities by 50 percent
(LL = 0.30, and cLL = 0.53, versus baseline of LL = 0.20, and 
c
LL = 0.35), bringing
them to the upper bound of the 95 percent interval discussed in Parry-Small. While also
increasing the value of the climate-change damage to EPF = $100 per ton of carbon. In
this case, now more than half of the countries would be undertaxing motor fuel. In terms
of GHG emissions, however, the group of undertaxing countries accounts now for only 8
percent more than in the baseline calculation.
3.1. Climate-Change Externality
When considering the effects of the changes in the climate-change emissions damage,
∆EPF , we may be inclined to expect a less than 1:1 response ∆tF because of the marginal
cost of funds adjustment. Indeed the first impact through the Adjusted Pigou component
(1) will be less than 1:1 as long as MEBL > 0. However, when a larger tF enters into
the Ramsey (2) and Congestion Feedback (3) components, there’s a second round of ad-
justments and tF must raise further to balance the left-hand side and right-hand side of
(1)–(3). When the all the dust is settled, the final impact ∆tF exceeds ∆EPF , by about
10
10 percent (Table 4).
Note also, that even if there were an international agreement on the value of the climate-
change externality, EPF , the impact of this component on the overall tax on motor fuel,
tF , varies in each country, as equations (1)–(3) make apparent.
4. Conclusions
The taxation of motor fuel displays a great variability across different countries. While
these products are generally subject to broadly similar consumption taxes, the rates applied
by individual countries, especially on the excise component, vary substantially. Parry and
Small (2005) develop a model balancing the level motor fuel taxes against all other taxes.
They show that the second-best optimal tax on motor fuel can be broken into several
components: an adjusted Pigovian tax to account for the external effects of motor fuel; a
general Ramsey-type consumption tax component; and a reduced-congestion feedback.
In this paper, we apply the Parry-Small framework to estimate the second-best optimal
level taxation of motor fuel for OECD and BRICs, which jointly account for about 80
percent of fossil-fuel world GHG emissions. In the benchmark specification, we find that six
countries, China, Russia, the U.S., Brazil, Mexico and Canada, accounting for more than
40 percent of transport oil GHG emissions, would be undertaxing fossil fuels. Increasing
the shadow value on GHG emissions to $100 per ton of carbon (from the $25 benchmark
value) and the size of the labor-leisure substitution response to wages result in more than
half the considered countries undertaxing fossil fuels.
We evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the values of the elasticities and externalities
that we use by computing numerical derivatives evaluated with each country’s specific
parameter values. We find that varying the values of these parameters—within the level of
uncertainty reasonably associated with them—significantly affects the quantitative results
although the qualitative results are more robust. This implies that, while informative, the
results must be taken as indicative. The further analysis for a particular country must rely
in a well-informed choice for the values of their country-specific parameters.
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Table 3. Optimal Motor Fuel Taxes: Benchmark Case
Benchmark Values for Labor Elasticities and Climate-Change Externality
(LL = 0.20, cLL = 0.35, and E
PF = $25 per ton of carbon.)
Optimal Fuel Tax
(U.S. cents/gal)
Actual Excess % World GHG
Total Tax Difference Burden Motor Fuel
Pigou Ramsey Cong.
tF t
0
F (tF − t0F ) (1 +MEBL) Emissions 1/
Countries that undertax motor fuel (tF > t
0
F ); account for 41% of motor fuel GHG world emissions
China 147 16 1 165 44 121 1.05 8.03
Russia 122 27 2 151 70 81 1.10 2.98
US 75 23 1 99 40 59 1.10 22.39
Brazil 80 73 2 156 100 56 1.19 2.28
Mexico 82 22 1 105 61 44 1.06 2.39
Canada 58 59 1 118 92 26 1.14 2.45
Countries that overtax motor fuel (tF < t
0
F ); account for 28% of motor fuel GHG world emissions
Hungary 71 151 2 224 227 -3 1.24 0.17
Greece 96 117 2 216 241 -25 1.17 0.49
France 98 251 5 353 379 -26 1.28 2.16
Luxembourg 124 114 2 241 280 -39 1.15 0.07
Italy 104 204 4 312 362 -50 1.23 2.06
Australia 62 42 1 105 156 -51 1.12 1.04
India 81 28 1 110 184 -74 1.08 3.15
Czech Republic 72 126 1 199 276 -77 1.18 0.23
Belgium 78 203 1 282 374 -92 1.24 0.51
Germany 129 175 5 309 402 -93 1.19 2.76
Austria 53 159 0 213 308 -95 1.23 0.35
Spain 64 94 1 158 254 -96 1.14 1.77
Denmark 48 227 0 275 385 -110 1.26 0.20
Sweden 34 175 0 209 321 -112 1.25 0.32
Japan 67 42 1 110 233 -123 1.11 5.45
UK 109 43 3 155 280 -125 1.15 1.76
Poland 72 123 1 196 327 -131 1.17 0.56
Portugal 62 172 1 236 371 -135 1.21 0.32
Slovak Republic 73 100 1 174 323 -149 1.14 0.08
Finland 73 145 2 219 390 -171 1.18 0.25
Iceland 74 77 1 152 327 -175 1.11 0.02
Netherlands 71 184 1 256 432 -176 1.20 0.63
Switzerland 51 74 0 126 311 -185 1.13 0.31
Ireland 52 83 0 135 327 -192 1.12 0.24
Korea 107 22 1 131 327 -196 1.06 1.82
South Africa 53 13 1 67 266 -199 1.08 0.57
Norway 53 126 1 180 399 -219 1.14 0.21
New Zealand 48 28 0 76 385 -309 1.10 0.17
Turkey 61 34 1 96 491 -395 1.11 0.72
1/ Source: Authors’ calculations and IEA (2006) CO2 Emissions by Sector.
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Table 4. Sensitivity of Optimal Motor Fuel Taxes to the values of several parameters
Response (in cents) of optimal motor fuel tax (∆tF ) to increase of:
0.1 in /c10 in
LL 
c
LL ηMI ηFF ηMF E
PF
Australia -0.6 4.8 -7.3 -12.6 7.2 10.9
Austria -1.4 21.0 -31.4 -28.0 6.7 10.8
Belgium -2.2 27.3 -41.0 -38.2 10.3 11.0
Brazil -0.9 9.0 -13.6 -19.2 10.0 11.2
Canada -0.6 6.9 -10.4 -13.6 6.5 10.8
China -0.3 1.7 -2.5 -14.8 16.0 12.2
Czech Republic -1.1 15.9 -23.8 -25.7 9.1 11.0
Denmark -1.5 30.8 -46.2 -37.1 6.0 10.7
Finland -0.8 17.7 -26.5 -27.9 9.1 10.7
France -1.8 34.4 -51.6 -50.1 14.1 11.2
Germany -1.2 21.5 -32.2 -40.7 17.2 11.0
Greece -1.0 14.1 -21.2 -27.0 12.0 10.9
Hungary -1.5 20.0 -30.0 -29.8 9.2 10.9
Iceland -0.6 8.8 -13.3 -18.3 8.6 10.6
India -0.4 3.1 -4.6 -13.9 9.8 11.3
Ireland -0.7 9.8 -14.7 -16.1 5.8 10.5
Italy -1.5 26.3 -39.4 -41.9 14.1 11.0
Japan -0.5 4.8 -7.3 -14.2 8.2 11.0
Korea -0.3 2.4 -3.6 -18.3 13.7 11.4
Luxembourg -1.4 13.9 -20.9 -30.5 15.7 11.1
Mexico -0.2 2.3 -3.4 -10.8 8.7 11.0
Netherlands -1.2 23.3 -35.0 -33.3 9.0 10.7
New Zealand -0.4 3.1 -4.7 -10.6 6.0 10.7
Norway -0.7 15.0 -22.5 -21.8 6.1 10.6
Poland -1.0 15.1 -22.6 -24.7 8.8 10.7
Portugal -1.1 22.2 -33.3 -30.9 7.9 10.9
Russia -0.7 3.1 -4.6 -16.3 14.9 12.6
Slovak Republic -0.8 11.8 -17.8 -21.4 8.7 10.7
South Africa -0.3 1.5 -2.2 -10.2 7.0 11.4
Spain -0.7 11.1 -16.7 -19.2 7.5 10.7
Sweden -1.0 23.4 -35.0 -27.7 4.0 10.7
Switzerland -0.7 8.9 -13.3 -15.4 6.0 10.7
Turkey -0.5 4.0 -6.0 -14.4 8.2 11.0
U.K. -1.0 5.2 -7.7 -24.6 16.5 12.3
U.S. -0.6 2.8 -4.1 -10.3 8.4 11.8
Mean -0.9 12.8 -19.1 -23.1 9.6 11.0
Median -0.8 11.5 -17.2 -21.6 8.8 10.9
Standard Deviation 0.5 9.3 14.0 10.2 3.5 0.50
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Table 5. Optimal Motor Fuel Taxes: High-Tax Case
High Labor Elasticities and High Value for Climate-Change Externality
(LL = 0.30, cLL = 0.53, and E
PF = $100 per ton of carbon.)
Optimal Fuel Tax
(U.S. cents/gal)
Actual Excess % World GHG
Total Tax Difference Burden Motor Fuel
Pigou Ramsey Cong.
tF t
0
F (tF − t0F ) (1 +MEBL) Emissions 1/
Countries that undertax motor fuel (tF > t
0
F ); account for 50% of motor fuel GHG world emissions
France 103 461 7 571 379 192 1.48 2.16
China 165 27 2 194 44 150 1.07 8.03
Hungary 80 269 3 351 227 124 1.40 0.17
Brazil 91 127 4 222 100 122 1.30 2.28
Russia 137 46 3 186 70 116 1.16 2.98
Italy 111 358 6 476 362 114 1.38 2.06
US 90 40 1 132 40 92 1.16 22.39
Denmark 57 411 1 468 385 83 1.45 0.20
Canada 71 99 1 172 92 80 1.22 2.45
Belgium 86 363 1 450 374 76 1.40 0.51
Mexico 98 35 1 135 61 74 1.09 2.39
Greece 107 197 4 308 241 67 1.27 0.49
Luxembourg 134 192 3 330 280 50 1.24 0.07
Germany 137 299 7 443 402 41 1.31 2.76
Sweden 44 315 0 360 321 39 1.43 0.32
Austria 63 282 1 346 308 38 1.38 0.35
Czech Republic 83 218 2 303 276 27 1.30 0.23
Portugal 72 303 2 377 371 6 1.34 0.32
Countries that overtax motor fuel (tF < t
0
F ); account for 19% of motor fuel GHG world emissions
Australia 76 70 1 147 156 -9 1.18 1.04
Spain 76 157 2 234 254 -20 1.23 1.77
Netherlands 81 318 2 401 432 -31 1.33 0.63
Poland 83 209 2 293 327 -34 1.27 0.56
India 97 46 2 144 184 -40 1.13 3.15
Finland 83 246 3 333 390 -57 1.28 0.25
Slovak Republic 85 166 2 253 323 -70 1.22 0.08
UK 121 75 5 201 280 -79 1.24 1.76
Japan 81 71 2 154 233 -79 1.18 5.45
Iceland 88 126 1 215 327 -112 1.17 0.02
Norway 66 211 1 278 399 -121 1.23 0.21
Switzerland 65 124 0 189 311 -122 1.21 0.31
Ireland 66 137 0 203 327 -124 1.19 0.24
Korea 124 37 2 162 327 -165 1.09 1.82
South Africa 70 23 1 93 266 -173 1.11 0.57
New Zealand 64 46 1 110 385 -275 1.15 0.17
Turkey 76 58 1 135 491 -356 1.17 0.72
1/ Source: Authors’ calculations and IEA (2006) CO2 Emissions by Sector.
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Table 6. Parameter Values
Taxes and Producer Fuel Congestion Accident Share of Fuel Government
Prices (U.S.$/Gallon) Intensity Costs Costs Production Size
t0F qF Sum Source α
0
FM Source E
C Source EA Source αF Source αG Source
Australia 1.56 2.12 3.68 (1) 21.57 (5) 3.10 (9) 2.63 (21) 0.01 (29) 0.35 (30)
Austria 3.08 4.52 7.60 (1) 31.00 (3) 3.81 (10) 2.30 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.49 (30)
Belgium 3.74 5.41 9.15 (1) 31.00 (3) 5.46 (10) 4.32 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.50 (30)
Brazil 1.00 2.12 3.12 (2) 21.38 (6) 5.60 (11) 2.29 (23) 0.02 (29) 0.45 (30)
Canada 0.92 2.57 3.49 (1) 20.45 (5) 3.10 (9) 2.10 (9) 0.02 (29) 0.39 (30)
China 0.45 1.19 1.64 (1) 26.72 (6) 7.82 (12) 1.71 (24) 0.01 (29) 0.20 (30)
Czech Rep. 2.76 4.43 7.19 (1) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.02 (29) 0.44 (30)
Denmark 3.85 5.79 9.64 (1) 33.12 (5) 1.96 (10) 1.78 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.52 (30)
Finland 3.90 5.43 9.33 (1) 34.08 (5) 3.19 (10) 1.03 (22) 0.02 (29) 0.43 (30)
France 3.79 5.45 9.24 (1) 31.57 (5) 4.53 (10) 2.03 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.53 (30)
Germany 4.02 5.54 9.56 (1) 26.72 (5) 5.35 (10) 2.83 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.45 (30)
Greece 2.41 4.17 6.58 (1) 39.52 (5) 3.60 (10) 1.23 (22) 0.02 (29) 0.43 (30)
Hungary 2.27 3.85 6.12 (1) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.02 (29) 0.50 (30)
Iceland 3.27 4.24 7.51 (3) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.01 (29) 0.43 (30)
India 1.85 1.80 3.65 (2) 23.75 (6) 2.15 (14) 2.29 (23) 0.01 (29) 0.28 (30)
Ireland 3.27 4.79 8.06 (1) 26.88 (5) 0.82 (10) 3.10 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.35 (30)
Italy 3.62 5.53 9.15 (1) 34.58 (5) 5.15 (10) 1.85 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.49 (30)
Japan 2.33 2.12 4.45 (1) 21.77 (5) 4.67 (15) 2.10 (9) 0.01 (29) 0.35 (30)
Korea, Rep. 3.27 1.94 5.21 (1) 26.42 (7) 6.93 (16) 2.97 (23) 0.01 (29) 0.22 (30)
Luxembourg 2.80 4.53 7.33 (1) 31.00 (3) 4.63 (10) 4.60 (22) 0.02 (29) 0.40 (30)
Mexico 0.69 2.01 2.70 (1) 22.80 (8) 6.07 (17) 0.34 (25) 0.02 (29) 0.23 (30)
Netherlands 4.32 6.06 10.38 (1) 29.40 (5) 8.54 (10) 2.68 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.46 (30)
New Zealand 0.00 3.30 3.30 (1) 23.75 (5) 2.33 (18) 2.10 (9) 0.02 (29) 0.32 (30)
Norway 4.00 6.24 10.24 (2) 28.68 (5) 1.54 (10) 1.60 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.38 (30)
Poland 3.27 4.73 8.00 (3) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.01 (13) 0.43 (30)
Portugal 3.71 5.53 9.24 (1) 31.00 (3) 2.16 (10) 1.69 (22) 0.02 (29) 0.46 (30)
Russian Fed. 0.70 0.82 1.52 (2) 23.52 (6) 7.00 (19) 2.86 (26) 0.01 (29) 0.33 (30)
Slovak Rep. 3.23 4.82 8.05 (1) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.02 (29) 0.38 (30)
South Africa 0.83 2.66 3.49 (2) 27.00 (9) 3.10 (9) 1.14 (27) 0.03 (29) 0.28 (30)
Spain 2.54 4.28 6.82 (1) 31.00 (3) 4.53 (10) 1.41 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.39 (30)
Sweden 3.21 4.70 7.91 (1) 26.13 (5) 1.44 (10) 1.22 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.51 (30)
Switzerland 3.11 4.63 4.63 (4) 31.00 (3) 3.91 (10) 2.11 (22) 0.01 (29) 0.37 (30)
Turkey 4.91 1.83 6.74 (2) 31.00 (3) 2.40 (13) 2.24 (13) 0.00 (29) 0.33 (30)
U.S. 0.46 1.96 2.42 (1) 20.27 (5) 3.50 (20) 3.00 (20) 0.02 (29) 0.33 (30)
U.K. 4.07 1.97 6.04 (1) 30.94 (5) 7.00 (10) 2.40 (28) 0.00 (29) 0.41 (30)
Mean 2.66 3.66 6.38 28.37 3.93 2.20 0.01 0.39
Median 3.11 4.25 6.82 30.94 3.50 2.24 0.01 0.40
Standard Deviation 1.32 1.53 2.67 4.54 1.96 0.83 0.01 0.09
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Table 7. Sources of Data
(1) Energy De´tente (March, 2009)
(2) Energy De´tente (December, 2005)
(3) N/A. Used median value for European countries.
(4) Price from (1) and tax from OECD stats
(5) IEA (2007) Energy use in the New Millennium
(6) http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/review-international-policies-vehicle-motor fuel-efficiency
(7) http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1’(1)43417929.html
(8) http://www.autoproject.org.cn/english/new advance en/Mex%20TRB%20presentation.pdf
(9) N/A. Use median for the whole sample.
(10) Carisma and Lowder (2008)
(11) Willoughby (2002) based on estimates for Sao Paulo.
(12) Creutzig and He (2009).
(13) N/A. Use median for European countries.
(14) Estimate similar to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur from United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (2007).
(15) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2000).
(16) Korea Transport Institute (KOTI).
(17) Ochoa and Radian (1997).
(18) Jayaram et al. (1995)
(19) http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-russia-roads15-2009jul15,0,6188164.story
(20) Parry and Small (2005).
(21) Connelly and Supangan(2006.)
(22) INFRA/IWW (2004).
(23) Mohan (2002). Table found at http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0503.pdf
(24) http://www.car-accidents.com/country-car-accidents/china-car-accidents-crash.html
(25) Mendoza, Chavarr´ıa and Mayoral (1998).
(26) http://www.kommersant.com/p’(1)3563/r 500/Traffic accident/
(27) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi qa5327/is 291/ai n29030852/
(28) (22) as average accident costs in C/1,000 passenger and tonne-kilometres.
(29) IEA World Energy Statistics and Balances.
(30) IMF WEO Database.
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